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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
RANALE MANE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 880206 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for Murder in the 
Second Degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978) (Supp. 1988); Attempted Murder in the 
Second Degree, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 and 76-4-101 and 102 (1978) (Supp. 1988); and two 
counts of Aggravated Assault, both third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (i) (1987) (Supp. 1988), because defendant was convicted of a 
first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the charges of attempted homicide and 
aggravated assault involving other victims were lesser included 
offenses of the homicide involving Mike Brown, and whether the 
trial court erred in refusing to dismiss them during trial. 
2. Whether the doctrine of merger precluded the 
conviction and sentence of defendant for the attempted homicide 
and aggravated assault charges in addition to the homicide 
charge. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
refusing to accept defendant's plea of guilty to one or two of 
the charges during trial. 
4. Whether the trial court erred when it imposed 
sentencing enhancements for the use of a firearm for each of the 
felony convictions of defendant. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the 
following provisions: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1978), 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1978), 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1978), 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1978)(Supp. 1988), 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1978), 
6. Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-103 (1978), 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1978) (Supp. 1988), 
8. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978) (Supp. 1988), 
9. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-25(b)(2) (1982), 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 21, 1987, Defendant, along with two others, 
was charged with Murder in the First Degree, a capital offense, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202 (1978) (Supp. 1988); 
Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203, S 76-4-101 and 102 (1978) 
(Supp. 1988); and two counts of Aggravated Assault, both third 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(1978). 
After preliminary hearing, Defendant filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the charges against him, claiming, inter alia, that the 
Information was defective because it charged defendant with four 
counts. Defendant claimed that the Attempted Murder and 
Aggravated Assault charges were lesser included offenses of the 
Capital Murder charge (Record [hereinafter R.] at 100-101). The 
trial court received memoranda from counsel and then denied the 
motion, stating that it was without merit (R. at 116). 
Jury trial for defendant was held March 21 through 25, 
1988, in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah 
County, with the Honorable Boyd L. Park, District Judge, 
presiding. The jury found defendant guilty of Murder in the 
Second Degree, a lesser included offense to the Capital Murder 
charge, Attempted Murder, and both counts of Aggravated Assault. 
After a presentence report was prepared, the court 
received information from counsel regarding sentencing then 
pronounced the sentence as follows: 
Count I - Murder in the Second Degree, a 
First Degree Felony. The defendant is 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term 
of not less than five years, and which maybe 
[sic] for life, plus an additonal [sic] one 
year for the use of a firearm in the 
commission of the crime, to run consecutively 
with a five year minimum term. This term 
shall be for not less than six years. 
Count II - Attempted Murder in the Second 
Degree, a Second Degree Felony. The 
defendant is sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison for a term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years, plus an 
additional one year for the use of a firearm 
in the commission of the crime to run 
consecutively with the one year minimum term. 
This sentence shall be for not less than two 
years. 
Count III - Aggravated Assault, a Third 
Degree Felony. The defendant is sentenced to 
the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years and for an 
additional indeterminate term not to exceed 
five years for use of a firearm to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
Count IV - Aggravated Assault, a Third 
Degree Felony. The defendnt [sic] is 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an 
indetermiante [sic] term not to exceed five 
years and for an additional indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years for use of a 
firearm to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
The sentences on each separate count shall 
run consecutively and not concurrently. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of December 19, 1987, defendant and a 
friend, Savelio Fuga, went to a bar called the Silver Spur in 
downtown Provo (Transcript of trial [hereinafter T.] at 797-98). 
At the door as they entered was an employee of the bar named Tom 
Tromley who was collecting the admission fee from patrons and 
also serving as a bouncer (T. at 794-95). Also employed as 
bouncers there that Saturday night were Mike Brown and Poponatui 
Fifita (T. at 796, 836 and 958). The bar had engaged a band that 
evening and a sizeable crowd built up over the course of the 
evening, eventually numbering 175-200 people (T. at 798, 805-806 
and 847) . 
Tromley recalled that defendant and Fuga arrived about 
7:30 p.m. and questioned their need to pay the admission fee (T. 
at 798). After Tromley explained the purpose for the fee, 
defendant and Fuga paid the fee then went to the bar and ordered 
a pitcher of beer and sat at the bar (T. at 804). Defendant and 
Fuga continued ordering pitchers of beer, two at a time, until 
they had consumed three pitchers apiece and then they ordered a 
fourth pitcher for each of them (T. at 1046). 
Tromley continued working at the door until 
approximately 9:30 p.m. when the manager approached him and told 
him to go toward the back of the bar near the restrooms where 
there was a fight in progress (T. at 805). At this point 
approximately 175-200 people were in the bar (T. at 847). 
Tromley found defendant and another patron fighting and 
immediately grabbed defendant to eject him from the bar (T. at 
808-10). Tromley told both of the combatants that they had to 
leave because the bar rule was that all people involved in a 
fight are ejected (T. at 810). Tromley tried to take defendant 
out but defendant locked his arms around a pillar and refused to 
leave (T. at 810). Fifita, one of the other bouncers, approached 
defendant and suggested that they go outside and settle down (T. 
at 810). As Fifita approached Tromley and defendant, he saw Fuga 
throw a couple of punches at Tromley (T. at 963). Defendant and 
Fifita went outside with Tromley following them (T. at 810). 
Fuga followed along (T. at 810). 
Tromley went back into the bar and grabbed the other 
patron who had been involved in the fight and took him outside 
(T. at 811). That man tried to convince Tromley that the fight 
was not his fault and that he should not be ejected but Tromley 
told him of the rule and walked him toward his car. The patron 
got in his vehicle and left (T. at 811). Fifita was still 
talking to defendant and Fuga as Tromley walked back into the bar 
to resume his duties at the door (T. at 812). Defendant and Fuga 
tried to convince Fifita to let them back in so that they could 
finish the two pitchers of beer that they had just purchased (T. 
at 964 and 1046). They argued with Fifita until he finally told 
them to go in and talk to Tromley about getting back in (T. at 
964-65). They opened the door and Tromley pointed out the door, 
indicating that they were not to return (T. at 812). Defendant 
and Fuga opened the door again and acted as if they were going to 
"bolt" in (T. at 812). Tromley grabbed them by their shirt 
fronts and pushed them back out the door and defendant swung a 
fist and hit Tromley (T. at 812). The three started struggling, 
with Fifita trying to intervene, and Tromley's shirt was torn off 
(T. at 813). Fifita took hold of defendant and Fuga, then 
Tromley headed back into the bar to protect the till which he had 
left when forcing defendant and Fuga out (T. at 813). As Tromley 
walked back in, defendant told him that defendant was going to 
get a gun and come back and kill Tromley (T. at 813 and 1050). 
Defendant turned to Fuga and told him in Samoan to go get the gun 
(T. at 1051). Fuga then said to Tromley that they would return 
at closing time and that they were going to "get" Tromley (T. at 
814 and 1051) . 
After Tromley went back into the building, Fifita heard 
defendant say that he would be back with a gun and Fifita told 
defendant and Fuga to just go home (T. at 966). The two walked 
toward their vehicle then defendant turned around and told Fifita 
not to tell Tromley about the threat to get a gun or Fifita would 
"get it" (T. at 966). Defendant walked back to the car then 
turned back to Fifita and grabbed his arms and told him to go 
with defendant and Fuga (T. at 966). Fifita told them to just 
leave (T. at 966-67) . 
Tromley reported the incident to the police who arrived 
at about 10:15 p.m. (T. at 814-15). Defendant and Fuga were gone 
when the police arrived and the officers stayed a brief time then 
left (T. at 815). According to Fuga, he and defendant left the 
bar and drove to Fuga's house (T. at 1052). Defendant was angry 
and pounded on the windshield of the car; he broke the seat of 
the car, the rearview mirror and the handle on the passenger 
window (T. at 1052-53). Defendant demanded that Fuga get the gun 
and swore when Fuga said that defendant had to go home (T. at 
1053). Fuga and defendant went to Fuga's house where they 
retrieved a handgun and clip with bullets which Fuga had received 
earlier in the year from a third codefendant as payment for a 
debt (T. at 1055 and 1059). Fuga took the gun and clip from a 
briefcase in his bedroom closet and handed them to defendant who 
inserted the clip into the gun (T. at 1055 and 1058). 
Defendant and Fuga got into defendant's car which was 
at Fuga's house so that when they returned to the bar no one 
would recognized them by the vehicle (T. at 1061-62). When they 
got in the car, defendant pulled the slide on the gun into firing 
position and placed the gun next to him on the car seat (T. at 
1062-63). The two drove to a friend's house but he was not home, 
then they went to a 7-11 store and defendant bought two twelve-
packs of beer (T. at 1065-66). They drove to the house of a 
codefendant, Lene Tauilili, but he was not home (T. at 1067-68). 
They then drove to the Star Palace, a dancing establishment in 
Provo, and asked Tauilili's brother to help them but he refused 
(T. at 1068-69, 1473 and 1477). Defendant told Fuga that he 
wanted Tauilili's brother to go into the Silver Spur and see if 
Tromley was at the front desk (T. at 1069). 
When Tauilili's brother refused to help, defendant went 
into the Star Palace and brought Tauilili out (T. at 1070). With 
Fuga driving, the three went back to Center Street and parked 
across the street from the Silver Spur (T. at 1071-72). On the 
way, defendant told Tauilili of his fight with Tromley and 
threatened to kill Fuga and Tauilili if they told anyone what 
defendant was planning (T. at 1071-72). Defendant told Tauilili 
that Tauilili was to go in so that no one would recognize him (T. 
at 1079). When they had parked, defendant gave Tauilili money 
for the cover charge and sent him in the bar to see where Tromley 
was (T. at 1073). Tauilili returned after 10 or 15 minutes and 
defendant became angry with him and, in Samoan, said he was 
"almost going to kill" Tauilili (T. at 1076). Fuga tried to grab 
the gun away from defendant but was unsuccessful (T. at 1078). 
At defendant's insistence, Fuga moved the car to the north side 
of Center Street, closer to the bar (T. at 1080). Defendant took 
the gun and got out of the car and walked toward the Silver Spur 
(T. at 1080-81) . 
At this time, which was about 12:45 a.m., the bar was 
beginning to clear as the bouncers began moving people toward the 
exit but there were still approximately 150 people inside, moving 
toward the front door (T. at 824-25). Tromley had gone outside 
the bar to hail a taxi for a patron (T. at 815). While outside, 
he was approached by a juvenile and asked to page the juvenile's 
parents in the bar (T. at 815). At this point, he saw defendant 
coming down the street toward the bar (T. at 815). Tromley went 
inside to ask the band to page the juvenile's parents and, as he 
passed Mike Brown, another bouncer, he told Brown that the guy 
who had threatened to shoot him was outside (T. at 817). As 
Tromley headed toward the band, Brown walked to the door (T. at 
817). When Tromley saw that, he ran back toward Brown and the 
door and had his hand on Brown's shoulder when Brown opened the 
door (T. at 817-18). Right outside the door stood defendant (T. 
at 818). Tromley told defendant that he could not come in and 
defendant smiled and raised his right hand with the gun in it to 
a level about chest high (T. at 818 and 820). Tromley turned 
toward the bar in an effort to escape and heard three or four 
shots fired as he turned away from the door (T. at 818 and 839-
40). There were several people around the door because it was 
closing time and the patrons had been leaving the bar (T. at 818-
19). One woman, Becky Orr, was standing near the door and 
Tromley pushed her out of the line of fire as he dove for the bar 
(T. at 819 and 840-41). After the initial shots, Tromley looked 
over his left shoulder and saw defendant level the gun at him and 
he heard two more shots as he dove behind a video arcade machine 
at the bar (T. at 819 and 840-44). Tromley then heard one more 
shot which was muffled and he assumed came from outside the 
building (T. at 819 and 841). 
Scott Orr was a patron of the bar who had arrived with 
his wife and his friends at about 8:30 p.m. and had danced and 
drunk beer throughout the evening (T. at 916-17). As the patrons 
were leaving the bar at approximately 12:30 a.m., Orr walked to 
the door, which was partially open, and pulled it open so that he 
and his wife could exit (T. at 919). The band was through 
playing, the lights had been turned on and there were at least 
20-30 people standing immediately around the doorway, getting 
ready to leave the bar (T. at 923 and 931). In the doorway was a 
"[b]ig guyM who blocked the way so that Orr could not leave (T. 
at 919). Orr assumed, correctly, that it was one of the bouncers 
(Mike Brown) and waited for him to step aside so that the Orrs 
could leave (T. at 919-20). Orr heard a "popping noise" and 
thought that someone had lit firecrackers (T. at 919-20 and 928). 
He turned to his wife, who was right behind him, to make sure 
that she hadn't stepped on the supposed firecrackers and felt a 
"burning sensation" (T. at 920, 923 and 928). He turned back and 
saw that Brown was no longer standing in front of him but was 
lying on the ground (T. at 920 and 928-29). He let the door 
swing shut, realized that he had been shot, then heard more 
gunshots from the other side of the door and moved away from 
behind the door (T. at 920 and 928-30). The last two shots that 
he heard sounded as if they were right outside the door then he 
didn't hear any more shots because of the noise and confusion as 
people ran and screamed inside the bar (T. at 930)• Orr had been 
shot near the armpit with the bullet exiting toward the back (T. 
at 820 and 921) . 
Cliff Argyle and Bill Duncan were also at the Silver 
Spur with some of their friends that evening (T. at 861-62). 
They were the first ones leaving when Duncan bumped into 
defendant just outside the doorway and defendant apologized (T. 
at 864-65 and 875). Duncan responded as he and his friends kept 
walking, then he heard what he thought were firecrackers coming 
from behind them (T. at 865-66). Duncan kept walking as he 
slowly turned and glanced back toward the door of the bar (T. at 
866). He saw "fire" that appeared to be coming from defendant's 
hand and aimed toward Mike Brown who was in the doorway three to 
four feet from defendant (T. at 866-67). Duncan heard a "couple 
of . . . shots" and saw Brown slumping down (T. at 867), 
Thinking it was a staged joke, he turned to one of his friends 
then he heard a couple more shots and saw defendant look, then 
start running, toward them (T. at 867). Defendant ran between 
two of Duncan's friends who were walking five to ten feet behind 
him and Argyle, then pointed the gun at Duncan (T. at 868). He 
got closer and pointed the gun at Argyle and fired point blank, 
hitting him in the back (T. at 868-69 and 904). The bullet 
entered his back and travelled under the skin but outside the 
ribcage, exited in the front and went through his wrist (T. at 
904-905). 
Meanwhile, inside the bar, Tromley stood up from behind 
the arcade and thought that defendant had been shooting blanks 
because he, Tromley, had not been hit (T. at 820). He saw Orr 
leaning against the wall and thought Orr was joking when he said 
that he had been shot, then Tromley saw the blood on Orr's shirt 
and went to him and inspected the wound (T. at 820). Tromley 
opened that door, expecting to see Brown holding defendant for 
the police, but instead found Brown lying in front of the door 
(T. at 820-21). He held Brown until the paramedics arrived but 
realized that the chance of recovery was slim when he saw that 
the back of Brown's head was "about gone" (T. at 821). 
Brown was transported to the Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center where he was pronounced dead of multiple gunshot 
wounds at 3:05 a.m. (T. at 1140). An autopsy revealed that Brown 
had two gunshot wounds to the face which exited from the back and 
side of his head, both passing through his brain (T. at 1150-51). 
Brown also had a superficial wound from a bullet which entered 
his chest, travelled under the skin then exited again from his 
chest (T. at 1152). The fourth wound was from a bullet which 
entered his right buttock then came to rest in the left hip 
socket (T. at 1152) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The charges of the attempted homicide of Tom Tromley 
and the aggravated assaults of Scott Orr and Cliff Argyle are not 
lesser included offenses of the homicide charge for the killing 
of Mike Brown. The four charges filed against defendant involved 
four separate acts of firing a handgun and four separate victims. 
While they were all part of a single criminal episode, the fact 
that they were separate acts with separate victims allows them to 
be charged as separate offenses. 
The doctrine of merger does not preclude the charging 
of the four separate offenses in this case. That doctrine 
provides that the predicate felony which is an aggravating 
circumstance elevating a crime to capital homicide under Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-5-202(1)(d) merges into the capital offense for 
purposes of conviction and punishment. This does not apply to 
the charging of a capital offense along with other felonies so is 
inapplicable in the present case because defendant was not 
convicted of a capital crime. Neither were the attempted 
homicide and aggravated assault charges predicate felonies under 
that section. Defendant was charged with the aggravating 
circumstance of creating a great risk of death to a person other 
than the victim and the actor. The fact that he emptied his 
handgun into a crowded bar with at least 20-30 people in the 
immediate vicinity supports that charging of this factor as an 
aggravating circumstance even if no one else had been wounded. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
refused to accept defendant's offer to plead guilty to a less 
serious offense when, as in this case, defendant's purpose was to 
try to avoid prosecution for the homicide charge. Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to accept a 
guilty plea but does not mandate that a court must accept a 
guilty plea when offered. 
Utah law allows a sentencing court to impose sentencing 
enhancements for the use of a firearms for each felony of which 
defendant was convicted. The statute states that, in the case of 
first and second degree felonies, the court must give an 
additional one year sentence for the use of a firearm in the 
commission of the felony. The statutory language does not limit 
the enhancement to one enhancing term for a single criminal 
episode but mandates the enhancement for each first or second 
degree felony. Since defendant was properly convicted of four 
felonies arising out of a single criminal episode, the attachment 
of four enhancement terms was proper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED, CONVICTED AND 
SENTENCED FOR SEPARATE CRIMES ARISING FROM 
SEPARATE ACTS WHICH WERE PART OF THE SAME 
CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
Defendant's brief revolves around defendant's 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1978). While 
defendant speaks in terms of "lesser included offenses", it 
appears that he is really addressing the doctrine of merger in 
his argument. This doctrine will be discussed further in Point 
II of this brief. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the 
Information under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-25(b)(2) (1982), 
claiming, inter alia, that the Information "unreasonably and 
improperly br[ought] multiple charges for the same acts." (R. at 
100-101). That motion was denied as being without merit (R. at 
116). Again, at the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief at 
trial, defendant moved to dismiss Counts II, III and IV of the 
Information, claiming that the attempted homicide and two charges 
of aggravated assault were all lesser included offenses of the 
capital homicide charge (T. at 1407-1408). The court took that 
matter under advisement at that point (T. at 1419) and defendant 
renewed the motion at the close of his own case-in-chief (T. at 
1641-42). The court denied the motion (T. at 1642). 
Also after the State's case-in-chief, defendant offered 
to plead guilty to the aggravated assault charge involving Scott 
Orr (T. at 1419), obviously in an attempt to claim double 
jeopardy and avoid prosecution for the homicide and attempted 
homicide charges (See Appellant's Brief at 19-20). The court 
would not accept defendant's plea at that point (T. at 1419). 
Defendant renewed the motion at the close of his case-in-chief 
but the court denied it because defendant had just testified that 
he had no memory of any of his actions which were the basis of 
the charges (T. at 1643). Defendant then offered to plead guilty 
to the attempted homicide charge involving Tromley as the victim 
on the claim that it was a lesser included offense of the capital 
charge involving Brown (T. 1643). The court denied that motion 
as well (T. at 1643) . 
A. Same Act. 
These maneuverings by defendant before and during trial 
expose the fallacy of the interpretation of the lesser included 
offense doctrine that defendant is trying to foist on this Court. 
Section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code states that: 
(1) [a] defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision; 
• • • 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense 
is so included whens 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit 
the offense charged or an offense otherwise 
included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
(emphasis added). There is little doubt that the shootings at 
the Silver Spur in Provo, on December 19, 1987, were all part of 
a single criminal episode. They happened in close proximity to 
each other and within a short period of time and were "incident 
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective". Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1978). The fact that 
they were part of a single criminal episode does not make the 
attempted homicide and aggravated assaults lesser included 
offenses of the capital homicide. Section 76-1-402 allows 
defendant to be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode. 
Defendant was charged with four separate offenses which arose out 
of the criminal episode of the shootings. Defendant argues that 
the four charges arose out of a single act so he could only be 
punished for one offense under that statute. The shootings were 
not a single act. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1978) defines "act" 
as "a voluntary bodily movement". Each time defendant pulled the 
trigger on the gun was a separate bodily movement or act. 
Defendant fired four times at Mike Brown, hitting his body with 
each bullet. Of course, defendant could not be charged with or 
convicted of multiple counts of the homicide of Brown because he 
fired four bullets, two at least of which would have been fatal 
it appears. Had only those shots involving a single victim been 
fired, defendant's argument may have had merit, but there were 
other acts by defendant which fully support the charging of 
separate offenses involving separate victims. 
The charge of attempted homicide involved the threat 
against and firing at Tom Tromley. From defendant's actions the 
night of the shootings, it is clear that he knowingly intended to 
cause the death of Tromley. He threatened Tromley earlier in the 
evening then took action which constituted substantial steps 
toward accomplishing that goal. He went to Fuga's home and 
retrieved the handgun then sought out a person to send into the 
bar to see if Tromley was there. He walked to the doorway of the 
bar, fired at Brown, then turned the gun toward Tromley and fired 
at him. The actions of getting the gun and firing directly at 
Tromley, coupled with the intent that defendant had expressed to 
kill Tromley, constituted attempted criminal homicide. The act 
of shooting at Tromley was not the same act of shooting at Mike 
Brown. Thus, convicting and sentencing defendant for both 
killing Brown and trying to kill Tromley was not punishing 
defendant for offenses arising out of the same act, as proscribed 
by Section 76-1-402(1). 
Neither was the conviction and sentence for aggravated 
assault committed by defendant on Cliff Argyle proscribed by that 
subsection. After defendant shot and killed Brown and fired at 
Tromley, he turned away from the doorway of the bar and ran 
toward Argyle and his friends. Duncan testified that defendant 
pointed the gun at him on the street but Duncan was not hit by 
any gunfire. Defendant then pointed the gun at Argyle from two 
feet away and fired, wounding him. The act of aiming at Argyle 
and pulling the trigger was not the same act as firing at Brown, 
or at Tromley. Since it was not the same act, defendant was not 
punished for a second offense caused by the same act when he was 
sentenced for shooting Argyle. 
It becomes a closer issue when the charge of aggravated 
assault involving Scott Orr is discussed. Three of the bullets 
fired at Brown at least partially exited his body. One bullet 
caused only a superficial wound before it exited Brown's chest. 
Orr was standing behind and a little to the right of Brown when 
Orr opened the door to the bar. There was discussion at trial 
that, perhaps, one of the bullets exiting Brown's body struck 
Orr, causing his wound (T. at 1415-16). That is a possibility 
but the evidence also shows that one of the shots fired at 
Tromley may have struck Orr. Orr testified that his wife was 
walking behind him as he was at the door and Mrs. Orr testified 
that she was the one Tromley pushed out of the was when he dove 
for the arcade (T. at 935). It was at this time that Tromley saw 
defendant fire at him. It is conceivable that one of these shots 
may have struck Orr because of his proximity to Tromley and Mrs. 
Orr. The same act, i.e., firing at Brown, may have caused the 
aggravated assault of Orr but the evidence also shows that other 
shots were fired which may have wounded Orr. 
Even if Orr was struck by a bullet which had already 
passed through the body of Brown, the evidence shows that that 
bullet could not have been one of the bullets which was fatal to 
-i p . 
Brown. The two shots which probably caused the death of Brown 
were the two shots to the head. One bullet entered Brown's head 
above the left eyebrow, travelled upward through his brain and 
exited from the top of his head (T. at 1150-51). No fragments of 
this bullet were found in Brown's head but the angle that it took 
raises the inference that this bullet went upward and would not 
be a bullet which could have then struck Orr (T. at 1172). The 
other head wound was from a bullet which entered the right cheek 
and passed through the brain and partially exited above Brown's 
left ear (T. at 1151). This bullet left fragments in Brown's 
head (T. at 1172) and exited in such a fashion that it probably 
also was not the bullet which struck Orr.. 
It is more probable to infer that, if any of the 
bullets fired at Brown was the one the struck Orr, it was the 
bullet which entered above the right nipple and passed 
superficially under the skin of Brown's chest and exited near the 
middle of his chest (T. at 1152). The act of firing the bullet 
which passed through Brown's chest was not the same act as firing 
either of the two bullets into Brown's brain. Since they were 
not the same act, Section 76-1-402(1) does not preclude 
defendant's punishment for both the murder of Mike Brown and the 
aggravated assault on Scott Orr. 
Since there is evidence which supports the jury's 
verdict convicting defendant of aggravated assault on Orr, this 
Court should grant deference to that verdict. This Court has 
long held that it would accord great deference to the jury 
verdict. It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. "[T]he 
'Court should only interfere when . . . reasonable men could not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 
State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah App. 1987), quoting 
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). Furthermore, 
defendant has the burden of establishing "'that the evidence was 
so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime.'" State v. Baily, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1985), quoting 
State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). 
B. Lesser Included Offenses. 
In his brief, defendant also takes the tack that 
Subsection (3) of the statute precludes his being charged and 
convicted of attempted homicide and aggravated assault because 
they are supposedly lesser included offenses of the capital 
homicide charge. That subsection states that M[a] defendant may 
be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1978). Defendant's claim 
that the attempted homicide and the aggravated assaults are 
lesser included offenses is without merit. Had the attempted 
homicide and aggravated assault charges involved the same victim, 
Mike Brown, they would have been lesser included offenses but 
they did not, they involved other victims. True examples of 
lesser included offenses to criminal homicide, murder in the 
first degree, are found in the jury instructions given in this 
case, at the request of defendant. Instruction 4 (R. at 157-58 
and 217) gave the elements of the lesser included offense of 
criminal homicide, murder in the second degree. Instruction 8 
(R. at 155 and 222) gave the elements of manslaughter. These are 
correctly termed lesser included offenses of the capital charge 
because they involve the same victim and their elements could be 
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required for commission of the capital offense. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402(3) . 
It is also important to note that the language of 
subsection (3) does not preclude the charging of the capital 
offense and any lesser included offenses; instead it proscribes 
the conviction for the capital offense and the lesser included 
offenses. In the case before this Court, defendant was charged 
with the capital offense but was convicted of a true lesser 
included offense of murder in the second degree. The attempted 
homicide and aggravated assaults on other victims were not lesser 
included offenses of the murder of Mike Brown so defendant's 
conviction for second degree murder and the attempted homicide 
and aggravated assaults is not proscribed by that statute. Since 
the conviction for these separate offenses was not proscribed, 
defendant's contention that the mere charging of the separate 
offenses was invalid is without merit. The separate offenses 
were properly charged and the court's refusal to dismiss the 
Information was clearly not error. 
C. Sentencing. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when he 
sentenced defendant for all four crimes of which he was 
convicted. As stated in this brief, these crimes were separate 
offenses and separate punishments were appropriate. Defendant's 
argument was rejected by this Court in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 
896 (Utah 1986), in which O'Brien contended that his convictions 
stemmed from one criminal episode so he should only have been 
given one sentence. This Court said: 
A defendant may not be punished twice for a 
single act. Although defendants' crimes were 
committed during a single criminal episode, 
the crimes were a result of separate and 
distinct acts that resulted in separate and 
distinct crimes. Thus, under U.C.A., 1953, § 
76-3-401(3) (Repl.Vol. 8B, 1978 ed.), which 
states, "A court may impose consecutive 
sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in section 
76-1-401," the trial judge was well within 
his discretion in sentencing defendants for 
four separate crimes. 
Id. at 900 (footnote omitted). Similarly in the present case, 
defendant committed four separate acts which became four separate 
crimes. 
The cases relied on by defendant to support his theory 
of lesser included offenses do not apply in this case and do not 
direct this Court to uphold defendant's position. Taking the 
cases as they are cited by defendant, each is distinguishable 
from the present case. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1986), involved a conviction for murder in the second degree, the 
charge originally leveled against Velarde. The issue raised in 
that case was whether Velarde was entitled to jury instructions 
on the lesser included offenses of that second degree murder 
charge. There was only one victim and one charge in that case 
and the requested instructions were for true lesser included 
offenses. This Court did state that aggravated assault was a 
lesser included offense of second degree murder, but that was 
under the fact that there was only one victim in that case. 
Since the original charge was not a capital offense, no 
aggravating circumstances were charged or proven, an issue that 
will be addressed elsewhere in this brief. 
Velarde should be contrasted with State v. Branch 743 
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 108 S. Ct. 1597 (1988), case 
which defendant does not cite. In Branch, defendant was 
convicted of aggravated robbery of a store clerk, aggravated 
assault of a customer who interrupted the robbery, and theft. 
Branch claimed that aggravated assault and theft were lesser 
included offenses of the aggravated robbery. This Court 
disagreed on the issue of the aggravated assault because "[i]n 
this case, aggravated robbery and aggravated assault were simply 
two offenses committed within the same criminal episode. The 
crimes required proof by different evidence and had two different 
victims." Branch, 743 P.2d at 1191. Just as in Branch, in the 
present case defendant's crimes required proof by different 
evidence and had more than one victim. 
In the next case cited by defendant, State v. Hill, 674 
P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), Hill was charged with and convicted of, 
inter alia, aggravated robbery and theft from the manager of a 
hotel. This Court looked at the statutory elements of the two 
charges, then considered the evidence presented in the case to 
conclude that theft was a lesser included offense of the 
aggravated robbery charge. It is clear that both offenses 
involved taking property from one individual only and the facts 
supported the finding that, in that case, theft was a lesser 
included. Neither charge involved a capital homicide charge with 
its attendant aggravating circumstances. 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), is often 
cited in arguments revolving around lesser included offenses. In 
that case, defendant was convicted of burglary and defendant 
claimed that the court erred in refusing to give his requested 
jury instruction on criminal trespass. This Court affirmed the 
conviction. It held that a lesser included jury instruction is 
appropriate not only when a crime is truly a lesser included 
offense. The law also requires that there be a rational basis 
for acquittal on the original charge. In the present case, jury 
instructions involving valid lesser included offenses of the 
capital charge were given and the jury even convicted defendant 
of one of them. The Baker case does not support defendant's 
contention that the attempted homicide and aggravated assault on 
different victims were lesser included offenses. State v. 
Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1978), also was a claim that failure 
to give a lesser included jury instruction was reversible error. 
The conviction was affirmed because defendant had not properly 
raised the issue at the trial level. This Court discussed 
whether carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle was a lesser 
included offense of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon and 
concluded that the elements were too disparate to hold that it 
was. That case is inapplicable to the present case because 
Gandee involved a single act of being in possession of a firearm; 
the present case involves multiple acts of pulling a trigger. 
State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980), is 
inapposite for a different reason. In that case, Kimbel was 
charged with one count of felony theft but argued that the 
evidence supported only two charges of misdemeanor theft. 
Property was taken different times during one day from a single 
victim, and then sold. The Court found that the thefts were a 
continuing plan based on takings occurring throughout a single 
day. This theory can be applied to theft or embezzlement cases 
but not to the case at hand. Theft and embezzlement involve the 
taking of property which is the general intent which makes the 
actual transactions a continuing plan. In the present case, 
defendant intentionally shot and killed Mike Brown, he then 
intentionally fired at Tom Tromley in an attempt to kill him. 
One of the shots fired hit Scott Orr, then defendant turned and 
ran, stopping to fire at Cliff Argyle. Defendant argues that 
this is just one continuing plan which should only be punished as 
one offense, preferably one of the less serious offenses. To 
adopt the theory argued by defendant in this case would lead to 
the result of a person being convicted of only one offense if he 
were to open fire in a crowded place and kill hundreds of people 
but only to have intended to kill one of those hundreds.. If this 
Court applies the "general intent=continuing plan" theory to the 
present situation, the result would be a single, least serious 
offense conviction for a murderer. The State urges this Court to 
restrict the language of Kimbel to theft and embezzlement cases 
and not apply it to cases involving multiple types of crimes 
committed in a single criminal episode with, arguably, one 
general intent. As this Court said in State v. Ireland, 570 P. 2d 
1206 (Utah 1977) : 
To adopt defendant's interpretation of the 
statute would serve only to torture its clear 
wording to afford him the advantage of a 
single felony conviction. 
Id. at 1207. 
State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983), is not a 
lesser included offense analysis but, instead, is proposed by 
defendant for the proposition that the number of victims does not 
establish whether a defendant should be prosecuted for separate 
offenses. When a search warrant was served on Keith Bair's 
house, officers found some twenty to thirty firearms in a bedroom 
occupied occasionally by defendant, Nelson Bair. Nelson was 
charged with three counts of retaining stolen property. The guns 
found in defendant's possession had been stolen at different 
times but defendant was not charged with stealing them. He was 
charged with retaining the firearms all on the same day, the day 
that the search warrant was executed. Since the charge was 
retaining rather than the actual taking of the firearms, it did 
not matter that there were different victims of the theft. The 
evidence proved, not that defendant stole the guns on the 
different days that they were taken, but only that he was in 
possession, with knowledge of their stolen status, on a specific 
day. Because the defendant's action in that case was a single 
one of retaining the stolen firearms, he could only be prosecuted 
for one offense. That is not applicable to the present case 
because, as noted above, defendant's actions in this case 
constituted different acts within a single criminal episode. 
The State agrees that "the test of a lesser included 
offense is whether the greater offense cannot be committed 
without necessarily committing the lesser offense." State v. 
Seats, 131 Ariz. 89, 638 P.2d 1335 (1981), reh. denied, Jan. 20, 
1982. However, defendant has not shown that attempted homicide 
and aggravated assaults of other victims are lesser included 
offenses of the murder of Brown. The murder of Mike Brown could 
have been committed without the other crimes which occurred. The 
intentional shooting of Brown by defendant did not require the 
firing at other individuals which gave rise to the other charges. 
Thus, defendant's actions do not fit the test reiterated above to 
make the crimes against the other victims lesser included 
offenses. It is long settled in Utah that: 
[t]he rule as to when one offense is included 
in another is that the greater offense 
includes a lesser one when establishment of 
the greater would necessarily include proof 
of all the elements necessary to prove the 
lesser. Conversely, it is only when the 
proof of the lesser offense requires some 
element not involved in the greater offense 
that the lesser would not be an included 
offense. 
State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Utah 1981), quoting State 
v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1962). This Court in 
Williams elaborated: 
It is of no consequence that the evidence 
at trial might also establish guilt of 
another and lesser crime than that charged. 
As indicated, to constitute a "lesser and 
necessarily included offense" it must be of 
such a nature that as a matter of law and 
considered in the abstract, the greater crime 
as defined by statute or charged in the 
accusatory pleading "cannot be committed 
without necessarily committing [such other] 
offense." This rule has been constantly 
reiterated. . . . The lesser offense must 
"necessarily and at all times [be] included 
within another one." . . . "If, in the 
commission of acts made unlawful by one 
statute, the offender must always violate 
another, the one offense [i.e., the latter] 
is necessarily included in the other." 
[Citations omitted; emphasis and bracketed 
language in original.] 
State v. Williams, 636 P.2d at 1096, quoting People v. Escarcega, 
43 Cal.App.3d 391, 117 Cal.Rptr. 595 (1974). 
Applying this rule to the case at hand, it is clear 
that the criminal homicide charge was committed without 
necessarily committing the other crimes charged. The same is 
true of each of the charges. None of the charges stands in 
relationship to the others such that any one of them could only 
have been committed by necessarily committing the others. 
None of the other cases cited by defendant dictate a 
different conclusion. Defendant's statement that State v. 
Turbeville, 235 Kan. 993, 686 P.2d 138 (1984), is similar to the 
present case is fallacious. The Kansas court held that 
aggravated battery and attempted murder in that case were 
multiplicitous but only because they were based on a single 
action of shooting one victim. The other cases cited do not even 
approach a similarity with the present case. 
POINT II 
THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE FOR THE HOMICIDE OFFENSE 
AND THE SEPARATE CRIMES OF WHICH HE WAS 
CONVICTED. 
Defendant's arguments are couched in the terms of 
lesser included offenses but really deal with the doctrine of 
merger. This confusion is understandable given that Utah courts 
have used these terms almost interchangeably in their decisions. 
A careful reading of defendant's brief and the cases he cites 
makes it apparent that defendant's real contention is that the 
attempted homicide and aggravated assault charges against him 
were part of the aggravating circumstance that elevated the 
homicide charge to first degree. This does not make them lesser 
included offenses as that term is usually used but, instead, 
raises the argument that, as part of the aggravating circumstance 
for capital homicide, they should be merged into the homicide 
conviction. Granted there is overlap in the two concepts, but 
the State urges this Court to distinguish between the two 
doctrines by referring to the aggravating circumstances for 
purposes of merger as aggravating circumstances or predicate 
felonies and not as lesser included offenses. See. State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), for an analysis of Utah's 
merger doctrine in a different context. 
While the argument that the aggravating circumstance 
charged in this case merged with the homicide could be made (but 
must fail as argued hereafter), defendant does not correctly 
raise that argument. If the merger doctrine applies at all, it 
dictates that the aggravating circumstance charged merges with 
the homicide for purposes of conviction and sentencing. 
Defendant argues that the circumstance "merges" so that defendant 
should only have been convicted and sentenced for one of the less 
serious felonies, thus precluding conviction for the homicide. 
This construction has never been placed on the merger doctrine by 
any Utah court and would be a perversion of justice. To allow a 
defendant to plead guilty to an aggravated assault charged in an 
Information and thereby avoid responsibility for the homicide of 
a separate individual, charged in the same Information, would not 
be a correct application of the merger doctrine. 
It is also important to remember on this point that, 
while so charged, defendant was not convicted of capital 
homicide. As argued in Point I, the statutes do not preclude the 
charging of separate offenses but preclude the conviction and 
punishment for offenses which impermissibly overlap. The same is 
true of the merger doctrine. The cases do not speak in terms of 
impermissible charging but, instead, preclude punishment for the 
aggravating circumstance which has merged into the capital 
offense. In the present case, defendant was not convicted and 
sentenced for capital homicide but, instead, for second degree 
murder. Even if the aggravating circumstance in this case merged 
into the capital offense, there is no application of the merger 
doctrine because there was no capital conviction. 
The cases in which this Court has addressed the merger 
issue all involve convictions and sentences for capital homicide. 
State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), has been cited by 
defendant in support of his claim regarding lesser included 
offenses. While this Court uses that phrase in its opinion, 
respondent suggests that the case was decided on the doctrine of 
merger and the term used does not change the nature of the 
theory. In Shaffer, defendant was convicted of capital murder, 
aggravated robbery and theft and this Court affirmed the murder 
conviction while vacating the aggravated robbery and theft 
convictions. In 1980, defendant shot and killed Jack Croasdale, 
dumped his body in a canyon before taking his van, 
identification, credit cards and money. Shaffer assumed 
Croasdale's identity and used his credit cards and van and spent 
his money until Shaffer was arrested in Oregon. Shaffer was 
charged with capital murder alleging that he intentionally and 
knowingly killed Croasdale and alleging the statutory aggravating 
circumstances of murder while engaging in aggravated robbery or 
murder for pecuniary gain. 
Under that fact situation, this Court held that the 
theft offense was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery 
and that the aggravated robbery offense merged into the capital 
homicide. The Court said: 
There can be no doubt that, standing alone, 
the crimes of aggravated robbery and first 
degree murder are separate offenses. . . . 
However, under the test for separateness 
found in section 76-1-402(3), aggravated 
robbery becomes a lesser included offense of 
first degree felony murder where, in the 
situation such as the case at bar, the 
predicate felony for first degree murder is 
aggravated robbery. No additional facts or 
separate elements are required to prove 
aggravated robbery after first degree murder 
based on the predicate offense of aggravated 
robbery is shown. • . . If the greater crime 
is proven, then the lesser crime merges into 
it. Consequently, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-1-
402(3) prevents the defendant from being 
convicted and sentenced for aggravated 
robbery in addition to first degree murder 
where the aggravating circumstance is 
aggravated robbery. 
Id, at 1313-14. The Court added in footnote 3: 
We note that this holding must be 
carefully read. If the aggravating 
circumstance or predicate felony for first 
degree murder is different from an additional 
_ * i _ 
offense charged, there may be adequate 
independent grounds to convict the defendant 
of both offenses even though they arise out 
of a single criminal episode. For example, 
if special verdict forms in this case had 
indicated that the jury relied on the 
"pecuniary" or "other personal gain" 
aggravating circumstances, the defendant 
could have been convicted of both first 
degree murder and aggravated robbery. Under 
that circumstance, aggravated robbery would 
not be a lesser included offense since the 
jury would not rely on the same facts to 
establish the elements of each crime. . . . 
Id. at 1314 (citations omitted). 
Shaffer is not applicable to the present case because, 
as noted above, defendant was not convicted of the capital 
offense so any aggravating circumstance charged had nothing with 
which to merge. Neither were the attempted homicide and 
aggravated assault charges statutory aggravating circumstances 
which could merge if there had been a capital conviction. 
Defendant was not charged with committing any felony offenses as 
an aggravating circumstance under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
202(l)(d), but was charged under subsection (l)(d) " . . . 
knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than 
the victim and the actor." 
This Court addressed the use of that factor as an 
aggravating circumstance in the case of State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 
1338 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978). In that 
case, Pierre was convicted of three counts of first degree murder 
and two counts of aggravated robbery for the murder of Stanley 
Walker, Michelle Ansley and Carol Naisbitt and the robbery of 
Orren Walker and Stanley Walker. Pierre claimed as error a jury 
instruction which listed the creation of great risk of death to 
others as a circumstance which would justify a capital 
conviction. This Court rejected that claim, saying that the 
evidence sustained a jury finding that the killings and creation 
of the setting of great risk of death to the other victims 
"occurred within a brief span of time in which were formed a 
concatenating series of events." Ld. at 1335. 
This language was clarified in the subsequent case of 
State v. Johnson, 740 P.2d 1264 (Utah 1987). Addressing the 
present statute which lists the aggravating circumstances which 
elevate murder to a capital offense, this Court said: 
Section 76-5-202(1)(c) states that an 
actor commits first degree murder if he 
"knowingly or intentionally causes the death 
of another" under circumstances in which he 
"knowingly created a great risk of death to a 
person other than the victim or the actor." 
A proper reading of the statute requires an 
examination of the manner in which the 
killing occurred and consideration of whether 
the knowing and intentional killing took 
place under circumstances in which the actor 
knowingly exposed someone other than himself 
and his victim to a great risk of death 
because of his knowing or intentional murder 
of his victim. 
We agree with the New Jersey Superior 
Court's interpretation of New Jersey's first 
degree murder statute's grave risk of death 
aggravating factor. The court stated: 
[T]he facts must include a knowing or 
purposeful state of mind vis-a-vis the 
creation of a great risk of death, that 
there be a likelihood or high probability 
of great risk of death created, not just a 
mere possibility . . . and that there be 
at least another person within the "zone 
of danger" created by defendant's conduct. 
State v. Price, 195 N.J.Super. 285, 478 A.2d 
1249, 1260 (1984)(citations omitted). . . . 
740 P.2d at 1266-67. The evidence in the present case 
established that there were several people around the doorway to 
the Silver Spur when defendant opened fire (T. at 921). All of 
these people were within the "zone of danger" and supported the 
charging of the creation of great risk of death to others as an 
aggravating circumstance. 
This is similar to the case of State v. McMurtrey, 136 
Ariz. 93, 664 P.2d 637, cert, denied, 464 U.S. 858, 104 S.Ct. 
180, 78 L.Ed.2d 161 (1983) which this Court cited in Johnson. In 
McMurtrey, the defendant entered a crowded bar and fired at three 
people with whom he had argued. Two were killed and a third 
wounded and McMurtrey was convicted of two counts of first degree 
murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. The 
Arizona court found that the bar was crowded the night of the 
killings and that there were five to nine other people in the 
immediate area when the victims were shot. They said, "When he 
emptied his gun at the victims, appellant created a grave risk of 
death to those other people." 664 P.2d at 645 (citations 
omitted). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY REFUSING TO ACCEPT DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
IN THE MIDDLE OF TRIAL. 
Defendant complains that he was prejudiced because the 
trial court refused to accept his guilty plea to the charge of 
aggravated assault against Scott Orr at the conclusion of the 
State's case-in-chief (T. at 1419). Again, after the jury 
retired, defendant offered to plead guilty to that aggravated 
assault, then to the charge of attempted homicide (T. at 1943). 
Defendant's theory is that, if allowed to plead guilty to one of 
those charges, he would then have been able to preclude his 
conviction for the other charges under the lesser included 
offense theory. As noted in Point I, defendant's argument is a 
misapplication of the law so the judge's refusal of his guilty 
plea did not prejudice him. 
Defendant's claim that the court was obligated to 
accept his guilty plea when offered is without merit. Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the framework for 
the acceptance of pleas by criminal defendants. Subsection (e) 
states that M[t]he court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or 
no contest and shall not accept such a plea until the court has 
made the findings: . . . " Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Nothing in that statute requires a court to accept a 
guilty plea and the judge acted within his discretion in refusing 
to accept the plea. The offer at the close of the State's case 
was denied as premature (T. at 1421) and the offer at the close 
of the entire case was denied because the defendant had testified 
that he had no recollection of the shootings (T. at 1643). It 
was clear that defendant was attempting to forestall culpability 
for the more serious crime by pleading guilty to less serious 
offenses arising out of the episode. As discussed above, his 
theory for avoidance of criminal responsibility is without merit 
but would have consumed additional time and effort for the court 
to have addressed it. The court exercised justice and economy by 
allowing the jury to deliberate and arrive at their verdicts. 
The court was aware that the jury had been instructed regarding 
true lesser included offenses to the homicide charge and they 
could, as they did, acquit of the capital charge. With the 
capital charge no longer viable, defendant's contentions about 
the attempt to enter the guilty plea to aggravated assault 
obviating the need for trial on the homicide count became even 
less applicable. Thus it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
court to refuse to accept the guilty plea and to allow the jury 
to reach its verdicts. 
Since defendant was convicted of the charges to which 
he offered to plead guilty, his conviction for those charges did 
not prejudice him. 
POINT IV 
UNDER UTAH LAW, DEFENDANT WAS CORRECTLY 
SENTENCED, INCLUDING THE ENHANCEMENTS IMPOSED 
BY THE COURT FOR THE USE OF A FIREARM IN THE 
COMMISSION OF THESE OFFENSES. 
Defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms for 
the four crimes of which he was convicted and was given 
consecutive enhancement of his sentence for the use of a firearm 
in the commission of the crimes. He again raises the contention 
that this was error because, he claims, the less serious charges 
were lesser included offenses of the homicide and therefore he 
should not have been punished for them. The merits of that claim 
were addressed above. 
The second contention, that the firearms enhancement 
was erroneously applied, is also without merit. Defendant asks 
this Court to ignore the plain meaning of the Utah statute and to 
adopt California's rule for firearms enhancement. A reading of 
the California cases cited by defendant makes it clear that the 
California courts base their rulings on California statutes whi 
are totally different from Utah's. Utah's statute and case law 
support the actions of the trial court in imposing the 
enhancements in this case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1978)(Supp. 1988), provide 
that: 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the 
first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, . . . , and which may be for 
life but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm . . . was used in the commission 
or furtherance of the felony, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person 
convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the 
second degree, for a term at not less than 
one year nor more than 15 years but if the 
trier of fact finds a firearm . . . was 
used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term 
of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the 
third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact finds 
a firearm . . . was used in the commission 
or furtherance of the felony, the court 
may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
(emphasis added). The trial court followed this statute when 
sentencing defendant in this case. Since defendant's arguments 
about lesser included offenses and merger fail, defendant was 
properly convicted of four separate felonies. Count I was a 
first degree felony and defendant was properly sentenced to a 
term of not less than five years and which may be for life. The 
finder of fact found that a firearm was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony and the court, as required by the 
statute, imposed an additional year to run consecutively to the 
sentence on the felony. Count II involved a second degree felony 
and the court imposed the statutory term of not less than one nor 
more than fifteen years in prison. Again, it was found that a 
firearm was used in the commission of the felony and the 
mandatory additional consecutive term of one year was imposed. 
Counts III and IV were third degree felonies and the statutory 
terms in prison not to exceed five years were imposed. The court 
exercised its discretion and included the additional enhancements 
of terms not to exceed five years for the use of a firearm in the 
commission of the two felonies. All of the sentences were 
imposed to run consecutively, not concurrently, which ruling was 
within the court's discretion. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 
(1978) . 
Nothing in the statute limits the firearm enhancement 
to only one enhancement for all crimes arising out of a single 
criminal episode. The language is that the enhancement applies 
if the trier of fact finds that a firearm was used in the 
commission of the felony. The jury in this case found that a 
firearm had been used in the commission of each felony committed 
by defendant in this episode. Thus the statute allows, even 
mandates in the instance of the first and second degree felonies, 
the imposition of the enhancement for each felony. 
The few cases which have addressed the issue of firearm 
enhancement in Utah have tangentially addressed the question of 
enhancements for separate charges in the same criminal episode. 
The purpose behind the legislature's adoption of firearm 
enhancements was explained by the Utah Supreme court in State v. 
Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978). This Court rejected defendant's 
argument that the enhancement provision created a separate 
offense which should be separately charged, then explained that 
the legislature had the authority to increase the degree of crime 
where "instruments of violence" were used in its commission. Id. 
at 994. The legislature had the authority to also determine that 
some deadly weapons were more dangerous that others and their use 
was "more deserving of punishment." j[d. at 995. Thus, firearm 
enhancements are a valid exercise of legislative authority. 
Defendant's claim that his "double punishment" for using a 
firearm was impermissible is in direct contravention to well-
established law. . 
In 1977, an amendment to the enhancement statute caused 
some confusion in the trial courts which was cleared up by this 
Court in State v. Willet, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 1984). The language 
of the statute, in respect to first and second degree felonies, 
reads: 
. . . if the trier of fact finds a firearm . 
. . was used in the commission or furtherance 
of the felony, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of 
one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally 
sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years 
to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) and (2). In Willet, a problem arose 
when the trial court imposed the mandatory one year additional 
term and then imposed a consecutive term of up to five years in 
addition to the one year term, making a total enhancement of six 
years for a single crime. This Court directed that the trial 
court alter the sentence so that the total enhancement be five 
years rather than six. The trial court erred in imposing both 
the additional one year mandatory and the five year discretionary 
enhancements consecutively to each other. 
It was not until State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1986), that this Court addressed a case involving firearms 
enhancement in a multiple count conviction. In O'Brien, the 
defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated burglary, 
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft of firearms. 
As in Willet, the trial court had imposed two consecutive 
enhancements for the use of a firearm but the double enhancements 
were imposed for each conviction. The trial court was directed 
to reduce the enhancement sentence to one enhancement for each 
conviction but the Court did not condemn the additional terms 
imposed for the separate convictions. Impliedly, then, this 
Court has upheld the construction of the statute urged by the 
State in the present case. 
Nothing in the statute or the case law in Utah forbids 
the imposition of separate firearm enhancements for separate 
felony convictions arising out of a single criminal episode. 
Thus the imposition of the mandatory one year additional term for 
both the first and second degree felony convictions, and the 
discretionary additional term of up to five years for each of the 
third degree felonies in this case was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the jury's verdict of conviction 
in this case. 
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